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1. |
4 U.S.C. § 72, which is positive law, mandates that all offices of government are restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless Congress “expressly” extends said jurisdiction to other areas by United States law. |
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“All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.” 4 U.S.C. § 72 (Emphasis added)
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2. |
United States law 4 U.S.C. § 72 provides the litmus test for the jurisdiction of every office attached to the seat of government; which includes the Secretary and his alleged Delegates. |
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4 U.S.C. § 72 is concerned with “where” offices of the United States can exercise their authority. The breakdown of this law is as follows: |
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a. |
ALL offices attached to the seat of government are contemplated in this law and not just some offices – this includes the Secretary, the IRS and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), etc.; |
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b. |
The provisions of 4 U.S.C. § 72 are made mandatory by Congress by its use of the word “shall.” In other words, this is not an optional consideration for any United States officer or Agency; |
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c. |
The “exercise” of ALL government offices is by default limited to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” In other words, “the District of Columbia” is the starting place for jurisdiction not the exception; |
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d. |
An exception can be made to the limited jurisdiction of ALL offices attached to the seat of government to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” As set forth in 4 U.S.C. § 72, authority to act outside “the District of Columbia” must be “otherwise expressly provided by law.” In other words, if Congress intends to extend the authority of a particular office of the United States to areas outside “the District of Columbia,” it shall “expressly” delegate and extend said authority in United States law; and |
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e. |
Any “expressly” delegated exception to the limitations of an officer’s authority to that of “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” is to be authorized by Congress in “law.” In other words, since Congress (Legislative Branch) has the exclusive authority to create law for the United States, said exceptions will be found only in United States law and not in Codes of Regulations (Executive Branch) or in Supreme Court rulings (Judicial Branch). Only Congress by United States law can authorize or extend the authority of any government office outside “the District of Columbia,” pursuant to 4 U.S.C. § 72. |
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4. |
One of the key words in 4 U.S.C. § 72 is the word “expressly.” This means that when Congress extends the authority of any office or officer of the United States outside “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere,” Congress will do it by “expressly” extending the Secretary’s authority and by leaving no doubt that said authority has been “expressly” extended by Congress to an area outside “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” The definition of “expressly” from Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. is as follows: |
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"In an express manner; in direct and unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely; directly. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 336 Mo. 17, 76 S.W.2d. 685, 689. The opposite of impliedly. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d. 381, 396.” (emphasis added) |
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5. |
Any xception to the limitations of 4 USC § 72 to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” is to be authorized “expressly” by Congress in United States “law”. Pursuant to § 72, the Court is not empowered to extend the authority of the Secretary to any other places other than “the District of Columbia” (see case cited in ¶ 17.c herein) |
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6. |
Petitioner has recently discovered one such “expressly” provided law by which Congress extended the Secretary’s authority outside “the District of Columbia”. 48 USC § 1612(a) is cited herein as follows: |
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Jurisdiction. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of title 28, United States Code, and that of a bankruptcy court of the United States. The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal and civil proceedings in the Virgin Islands with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands, regardless of the degree of the offense or of the amount involved, except the ancillary laws relating to the income tax enacted by the legislature of the Virgin Islands. Any act or failure to act with respect to the income tax laws applicable to the Virgin Islands which would constitute a criminal offense described in chapter 75 of subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § § 7201 et seq.] shall constitute an offense against the government of the Virgin Islands and may be prosecuted in the name of the government of the Virgin Islands by the appropriate officers thereof in the District Court of the Virgin Islands without the request or consent of the United States attorney for the Virgin Islands, notwithstanding the provisions of section 27 of this Act [48 USCS § 1617]. (Emphasis added) |
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7. |
Unless Congress through United States law “expressly” grants to the Secretary the authority to Act outside “the District of Columbia” (the “WHERE” they can act), any non-specific and general authority dealing with “WHO” has authority or “WHAT” authority is given is to be construed as limited to and restricted to “the District of Columbia, and NOT ELSEWHERE,” pursuant to 4 USC § 72. |
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8. |
The Court is hereby moved to take mandatory judicial notice that Respondents’ actions were done pursuant to certain sections of the IRC and there is no evidence in the record to prove that said sections have been “expressly” extended to the several 50 union states by law. To protect Petitioner’s rights, Respondents and this Court have a duty to demonstrate that in like manner, the authority of the Secretary has been “expressly” extended to the several 50 union states; otherwise this Court is unlawfully making Petitioner subject to said IRC sections without placing in the record the law (Act of Congress) by which Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several 50 union states and in so doing. If this Court does not put proof in the record of the Secretary’s jurisdiction pursuant to 4 USC § 72, then this Court has violated Petitioner’s rights, as protected by the Constitution and United States law. |
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Petitioner has been unable to find any United States law which “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several 50 union states as Congress has so “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the Virgin Islands; soil over which Congress has "exclusive” legislative jurisdiction in contradistinction to the several 50 union states (1); soil over which Congress does NOT have “exclusive” legislative jurisdiction. |
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10. |
Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 635, quoted in part as follows, states: |
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"...it is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizens, and against stealthy encroachment thereon.” |
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11.
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Based on Boyd v. U.S., this Court has a duty to protect the rights of Petitioner. This is especially true in matters of jurisdiction. Since the Secretary has not been “expressly” granted the authority by Congress to exercise his powers within the several 50 union states (2), this Court has a duty to find that neither the Secretary nor his Delegates (“Respondents”) have the “expressly” extended authority to administer or enforce any Title 26 laws unless the record reflects the “expressly” granted authority of the Secretary in the several 50 union states pursuant to 4 USC § 72. |
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12. |
It has been long established by the Courts that jurisdiction is paramount to an Agencies authority to act. The following ruling demonstrates that it is not frivolous for Petitioner to ask what Act of Congress “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several 50 union states: |
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The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the States, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government.” [Caha v. United States, 152 US 211] |
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13. |
The location of “United States”, as defined by law, further confirms the evidence herein that the authority of the Secretary is restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere.” The Uniform Commercial Code at § 9-307(h) states: |
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"(h) The United States is located in the District of Columbia.” |
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14.
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This exact provision is reflected in various state codes, including, but not limited to California and Texas. (3) |
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15. |
Unless this Court can establish that Congress has so “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several 50 union states, the Actions of Respondents are null and void: |
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"Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of administrative agencies [i.e., referrals to the DOJ] and where jurisdictional requirements are not satisfied, the action of the agency is a nullity...” City Street Improv Co. v. Pearson, 181 C 640, 185 P. (1962); O’Neil v. Dept. of Professional & Vocational Standards, 7 CA2d 393, 46 P2d 234 |
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16. |
There is no proof of jurisdiction in the administrative or judicial record of this civil action to rebut the facts and law as presented by Petitioner relative to 4 USC § 72. This Court is required to put on the record the jurisdiction of the Secretary pursuant to 4 USC § 72. Failure to do so is a denial of Petitioner’s rights to due process: |
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"The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings” [Hagans v. Lavine, 415 US 533] |
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17.
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Court should not be deceived by the smoke and mirror tactics of Respondents. Non-responsive answers by Respondents to date are as follows: |
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a. |
Treasury Order 150-10 extends the Secretary’s authority to the Commissioner. |
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This Treasury Order does not address the “expressly” delegated authority of the Secretary; |
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ii. |
Furthermore, this is a general delegation of authority which addresses “WHAT” the Commissioner can do and does not address “WHERE” the Commissioner can exercise his authority pursuant to 4 USC § 72; |
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iii. |
Nothing in this TDO “expressly” extends the authority of the Commissioner to the several 50 union states; |
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iv. |
Furthermore, this Treasury Order has not been published in the Federal Register, pursuant to 44 USC § 1505 and 5 USC § 553 and therefore it is not applicable to the Citizens in the several 50 union states. The Secretary admits this by his ruling in 1953 (4), when the Secretary required all divisions or units of the IRS to publish in the Federal Register any item of concern to the American public. This was even more clearly stated in 1955 (5)as follows: |
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It shall be the policy to publish for public information all statements of practices and procedure issued primarily for internal use, and, hence, appearing in internal management documents, which affect rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes.
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v. |
Since TDO 150-10 has not been published in the Federal Register, it is not applicable to Citizens in the several 50 union states; and |
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vi. |
Therefore, citing TDO 150-10 is non-responsive. |
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b. |
Title 26 USC § 7621 authorizes the President to create internal revenue districts or join several states or districts into one district. |
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i. |
Since virtually all authority in Title 26 is granted to the Secretary by Congress, what new authority does the office of the Secretary have by Congress granting authority to the President? Would one argue that the authority granted to the President by Congress in all matters is automatically extended to the Secretary when Congress has not “expressly” done so? |
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ii. |
Secondly, the President has not created “internal revenue districts” in the several 50 union states. He has, however, created “customs districts” which are NOT Internal Revenue Districts. |
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iii. |
Until it can be shown how the authority granted by Congress to the office of President is a grant to the office of the Secretary, this answer is non-responsive. |
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c. |
Court rulings have stated that the IRS can exercise its authority within the several 50 states. |
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i. |
Every case cited to date is off-point. 4 USC § 72 states that any “expressly” granted exception to the limitations of “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” as mandated by 4 USC § 72, are to be found in United States law and NOT the Courts. |
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"Official powers cannot be extended beyond the terms and necessary implications of the grant. If broader powers be desirable, they must be conferred by Congress.” Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587 (1931) |
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ii. |
Unless the Courts can present the law which so “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary to the several 50 union states, said offices cannot exercise their authority outside “the District of Columbia” or the Virgin Islands pursuant to 4 USC § 72 and 48 USC § 1612 respectively; and |
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iii. |
Therefore citing court rulings is non-responsive. |
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18. |
This Court has a duty to address the issue of jurisdiction as cited herein. This Court cannot enforce internal revenue laws within the several 50 union states without a clear and “expressly” granted authority to the Secretary by Congress to the several 50 union states. To do so would be a denial of Petitioner’s rights pursuant to 18 USC § 242 and if supported and ignored by more than two, is a denial of Petitioner’s rights pursuant to 18 USC § 241. |
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19. |
There simply is no “expressly”, “unmistakable” and “explicitly” (see definition of Expressly in ¶ 4 herein) enacted law by which Congress has “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary or that of his alleged Delegates to administer and enforce internal revenue law outside “the District of Columbia” and within the several 50 union states with regard to Respondents’ Actions in this case. |
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20. |
All Respondents have to do is show Petitioner one Act of Congress which “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary, with regard to Respondents’ actions as cited in this case, to the several 50 union states and this controversy would be over. What could be more simple? |
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21. |
It is criminal, in light of the above, 4 U.S.C. § 72 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), for this Court NOT to presume that the authority of the Secretary, the Commissioner and the IRS are limited and restricted to “the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere” unless the Secretary can show the Court and Petitioner the “expressly” delegated authority in United States law by which Congress “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several 50 union states. |
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22. |
the recent confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Justices John G. Roberts, Jr. and Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr, it was reiterated numerous times that this country operates under the rule of law and that it is the law and the intent of Congress when it writes said law that dictates the outcome of cases and not the arbitrary decisions of the Court. If this is true, then the rule of law mandates that no office of the government can exercise their authority outside “the District of Columbia”, pursuant to 4 USC § 72, unless Congress “expressly” extends said authority as it did to the Virgin Islands, pursuant to 48 USC §§ 1612(a). Following the rule of law in spite of decades of the People’s misconceptions and the governments misrepresentations and in spite of the consequences resulting from following the law, is what makes the Court honorable. |
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23. |
In footnote 16 of a 1980 case, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, the court states: |
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"In another, not unrelated context, Chief Justice Marshall’s exposition in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat, 264 (1821), could well have been the explanation of the Rule of Necessity; he wrote that a court “must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them.” Id., at 404 (emphasis added) |
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Questions Relevant to 4 USC § 72 |
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a. |
Can Respondents point to ANY express legislative permission for the Secretary of the Treasury to operate outside of “the District of Columbia,” as mandated by Congress pursuant to 4 USC § 72? If not, by what authority does the Respondents and this Court extend the Secretary’s authority? |
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b. |
Does due process embrace or exclude Petitioner’s access to the letter of the law? |
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c. |
Can the Respondents enforce a law it can't openly explain or when they hide behind a protective order so as not to address this material fact in the record? |
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d. |
Is permitting the IRS to proceed against Petitioner knowing at all times that Congress has not “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary outside “the District of Columbia” to the several 50 union states (as presented herein) still an act of treason pursuant to U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, or has the Supreme Court changed its mind since 1980? |
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Footnotes: |
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Of Course, Respondent and the United States could present to this Court the United States law which “expressly” extends the authority of the Secretary and the DOJ to the several 50 union states. What could be simpler? However, at least 15 U.S. Attorney’s have been asked to present said authority and not one has been able to bring forward any said “expressly” delegated authority in United States law. Instead, they have claimed that claims based on 4 USC § 72 are frivolous without themselves offering any law in support of the notion that said jurisdiction claims are in fact frivolous or as in the case of Walden v. U.S., #A-05-CA-444-LY, U.S. District Court, Austin, TX, the Court issues a protective order so the United States does not have to expose the Material Fact that Congress has not so “expressly” extended the authority of the Secretary to the several 50 union states. Courts which simply declare that the IRS or the Secretary can exercise their authority in the several 50 union states without at the same time substantiating said declaration with an “expressly” extended authority granted by Congress in United States law is nothing more than an opinion and bears no weight when deciphering United States law 4 USC § 72 and determining if the Secretary has jurisdiction pursuant thereto. ( return to 9) |
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| 2. |
The DOJ’s independent authority as allegedly granted by Congress to prosecute cases within the several 50 union states is irrelevant unless the Secretary is “expressly” authorized by Congress to act within the several 50 union states, pursuant to 4 USC § 72. (return to 11) |
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| 3. |
See California Commercial Code § 9307(h) and Texas Business & Commerce Code § 9.307(h). (return to 14) |
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| 4. |
Revenue Ruling 2 (1953-1 CB 484). (return to 17) |
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| 5. |
Rev Procd. 55-1 (1955-2 CB 897) (return to 17) |
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